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Making it public: The effect of (private and public) wage proposals on 
efficiency and income distribution 
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Abstract: 
The implications of (public or private) pre-play communication and information revelation in 
a labour relationship is not well understood. We address these implications theoretically and 
experimentally. In our baseline experiments, the employer offers a wage to the worker who 
may then accept or reject it. In the public and private treatment, workers, moving first, make a 
non-binding private or public wage proposal. Our theoretical model assumes that wage 
proposals convey information about a worker’s minimum acceptable wage and are misreported 
with a certain probability. It predicts that, on average, wage proposals lead to higher wage 
offers and acceptance rates, with the highest wages under private proposals. While both, public 
and private, proposals increase efficiency over the baseline, private proposals generate higher 
worker incomes. Broad support for the theoretical predictions is found in the laboratory 
experiments. Our work has important implications for recent policies promoting public 
information on wage negotiations. We find that while wage proposals promote higher wages, 
efficiency, and income equality, public information on wage negotiations is likely to benefit 
firms more than workers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Albeit cheap talk, employers frequently ask workers for their expected wages in negotiations. 
The practice is common in professional sports, senior level management, academic hiring and 
many other highly skilled jobs. Proposals can take many forms with one-to-one negotiations to 
centralized mechanisms such as unions (at the firm, industry or national level) making wage 
proposals to employers. Despite their widespread use, these forms of wage institutions have 
been largely ignored.2 
In this paper, we study pre-play communication in a laboratory experiment of 
employment relationships where workers can make a non-binding wage proposal to their 
employer.  Our baseline follows the design of Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006) which looks at 
the traditional ex-ante wage posting structure (ultimatum game) where the employer makes 
wage offers to two workers. The worker can either accept or reject. On acceptance full surplus 
is realised, while zero surplus is obtained in the case of a rejection. We then modify this setting 
to allow for workers to first make private wage proposals that are non-binding for the firm. 
Firms observe the proposals and can then choose to make an offer that the worker may accept 
or reject.3 In the final treatment, we allow for public observability of past proposals for each 
worker pair at the end of each period4. We focus on the effect that different wage proposals 
have on the outcomes of the employment relationship. By comparing the effects of proposals 
with the baseline, we can study how pre-play communication affects wages, income 
distribution and overall efficiency. Our setting allows us to answer novel and interesting 
research questions: Are wage offers higher when workers are allowed to make ex-ante 
proposals? Do proposals increase the probability of accepting wage offers (and hence 
efficiency)? Who benefits from making wage proposals public information to other workers?  
To provide testable hypotheses for our experiment, we develop a theoretical framework 
that relies on the idea that workers’ wage proposals are pre-play cheap talk (see Farrell and 
Rabin 1996 for a review). In our model, non-binding proposals may convey information about 
the worker’s minimum acceptable wage with workers misreporting their private information 
with a certain positive probability. As a result, the optimal wage offer by the firm is a function 
of the workers’ wage proposals (which may be “partially” or “fully” revealing to the employer). 
                                                 
2 See, Caju, Gautier, Momferatou and Ward-Warmedinger (2008) for details on different forms of wage bargaining institutions. 
3 This is the ultimatum game version of the labor market institution where rejection of an offer results in zero surplus to both 
workers and the firm. In fact, most traditional markets are of this nature, where a rejection of an offer from one side results in 
zero surplus for both. A structure with counter proposals would be akin to a double auction or a bargaining framework. 
4 Our private and public proposals treatments resemble the design in Rigdon (2012) (demand side) ultimatum game 
experiment. Rigdon’s research goal is to analyse the gender wage gap under private proposals and whether it can be 
mitigated with public information. Therefore, our focus is quite different from hers. 
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We show that if we have a mix of “revealing” and “partially revealing” workers then the final 
wage offer will be increasing in the proposals as the firm faces a trade-off between the 
possibility of rejection of low offers and acceptance of higher ones. This simple intuition also 
sets the stage for our main theoretical hypothesis. First, we expect firm’s wage offers to be 
increasing in proposals. This implies that average wage offers under proposals should be 
greater than in the baseline (with no proposals). We also expect wage proposals to increase 
acceptance rates (and hence efficiency) relative to the baseline. Finally, due to conformity, 
public proposals make workers more likely to accept lower wages and hence, relative to private 
proposals, public proposals generate not only lower wages but also higher firm profits and a 
more equal income distribution.  
  Our experimental results are broadly consistent with our theoretical predictions. 
Overall, they indicate that introducing proposals prior to firm wage-setting decisions has 
important efficiency and distributional consequences. While wage proposals always increase 
efficiency, workers (firms) benefit more when proposals are private (public).5 Though not a 
direct test, our experimental results have implications for policy makers as we find the potential 
efficiency and distributional consequences of proposals that are a widely used instrument in 
wage negotiations. In our experimental setup public proposals benefit the firm that earns higher 
profits, while private proposals are more conducive towards improving workers’ wages. 
Moreover, both type of wage proposals increase income equality among workers.  On the other 
hand, we also find that the baseline without proposals is the most inefficient setting while also 
leading to the highest levels of income inequality. In a nutshell, our results indicate that while 
both types of wage proposals lead to higher wages, income equality and efficiency, public 
information benefits firms more than workers. While this finding runs counter to popular 
opinion on the effects of wage transparency, it is very much in line with recent field evidence 
showing that making the outcomes of wage negotiations public reduces individual workers’ 
bargaining power and hence wages (Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson, 2021). We suggest that a 
possible explanation for this is that, under public information, workers are more willing to 
conform to the proposals of others and less likely to reject wage offers.  
                                                 
5 While not our main focus, we also look at gender effects in our experiment (see Section 5.3). Wage proposals could be 
another avenue for gender wage discrimination if females have lower willingness to accept/propose. We find that making 
proposals privately (publicly), tend to increase male (female) wage proposals and hence overall income. Even though these 
differences are not statistically significant, this pattern of behavior resembles the “catch up” result in Rigdon (2012). 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We review the literature in Section 
2. We describe the experimental design and procedures in Section 3. We present our theoretical 
model in Section 4. The main results are reported in Section 5 and we conclude in Section 6.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The only paper that analyses (average) wage proposals, in a relationship between firms and 
workers is Bottino, García-Muñoz, Goddio and Kujal (2016). They studied the effect of worker 
entitlement to a wage on a gift exchange game. Their structure resembles that of a workers’ 
union making a non-binding single wage proposal to firms on behalf of a worker’s collective. 
An average non-binding wage proposal is presented to employers from the workers, who then 
independently respond by making wage offers in a double auction format (a la Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993). While average wages slightly increase, they find a negative 
relation between effort and wage expectations. The main difference with our study is that we 
present worker proposals to firms at an individual level. Additionally, we don´t consider effort 
levels to control for reciprocity effects. Also, they use a double auction set-up that as used in 
gift exchange experiments. We model a firm-worker relationship where offers are posted and 
can be only accepted or rejected. 
Another paper that also uses proposals in a (Demand Side) Ultimatum game to study 
the gender wage gap is Rigdon (2012). She finds that females ask for less and earn smaller 
amounts than their male counterparts. In her framework workers make proposals that are made 
public in a subsequent treatment. Making proposals public, i.e. proposals being made by others 
in a similar negotiating situation, directly influences the beliefs women have about proposals 
in the ultimatum game. Consequently, they ask for more, thus eliminating the negotiation gap 
and eliminating the gender gap in wages. In contrast to our study, Rigdon does not study a 
labour market interaction and uses a Demand Side Ultimatum Game. Additionally, the 
experiment does not consider a baseline treatment without proposals (since her research goal 
is quite different to ours) and her framework cannot be used to assess the overall effects of 
wage proposals.6 
                                                 
6 Yamamori et al. (2008) conducted a dictator game experiment in which the recipient states a request for the minimum offer 
that they are willing to receive before the dictator dictates their offer, finding that the latter increases as the recipient’s request 
increases to half of the share. Albeit in a quite different setting, their finding is in line with our own result that wage offers 
tend to increase with workers’ proposals.  
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Besides the abovementioned papers there is an experimental literature on negotiation 
related with our study. Their focus, however, is on the gender gap. Some of them consider the 
Ultimatum Game (Eckel and Grossman, 2001 and García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-
Gutiérrez, 2012), while others use different versions of negotiation games with several stages 
(Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri, 2018 and Exley, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2020). We will 
provide further details of these studies in the results section where we report our findings on 
gender. 
Cheap talk can be interpreted as the weakest form of worker participation where firms 
consider credible workers’ communication with a certain probability. Therefore, our research 
also adds to the literature on worker involvement in the wage participation process (Charness, 
et al. 2012, Charness et al. 2016, Jeworrek and Mertins, 2014, Franke, Gurtoviy and Mertins, 
2016, among others). Worker participation in the wage determination process occurs in many 
forms in the workplace. It can be through wage bargaining, centralised or decentralised, or 
direct participation of workers in the wage process. The latter has been studied in the lab 
(Charness et al. 2012) and the field (Jeworrek and Mertins, 2014). Other factors that have been 
studied are social comparison (Charness et al. 2016) or choosing from a menu of options 
(Franke, Gurtoviy and Mertins, 2016). The majority of this research, experimental or field, 
broadly confirms that worker participation increases worker productivity. 
Charness et al. (2016) argue that social comparison is important in labour markets and 
may affect one’s attitude towards an employer or intrinsic motivation. This is similar to our 
idea of conformity (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), when rival proposals are public, where 
workers observe proposals of a worker from an earlier period. The only channel through which 
conformity works in our setup is through adjustment of wage proposals. Our idea of conformity 
assumes that a worker’s proposal will mimic the co-worker’s previous proposal (Charness et 
al. 2016). 
A comment is due as to whether the behavioral traits identified in the experiment are 
present or applicable in markets outside the laboratory. While external validity is always an 
issue in any laboratory (or field) experiment, what is important is that qualitative results guide 
us in the right direction (see Kessler and Vesterlund, 2015 and Camerer, 2015). There is 
evidence that many of the behavioural traits observed in the laboratory are observed with high 
stakes (Cameron, 1999; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougareva, 2002: 
Jeworrek and Mertins, 2014) or extend to real world situations. Jeworrek and Mertins (2014) 
find that a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages, as had been 
suggested by laboratory evidence, extends to the field. They find that this policy indeed 
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enhances performance. Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007) compare an Ultimatum Game (UG 
hereafter) where participants were students and another UG where participants were 
newspaper’s readers and they found that results are similar, so there is a high degree of students 
population data validity. Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) find that professionals also are subject 
to the winner’s curse. Fairness concerns also play a prominent role in firm’s wage policies 
(Bewley and Bewley, 2009; Agell and Bennmarker, 2003) while, recent papers indicate that 
laboratory measures of social preferences can be good predictors of behavior in field settings. 
Karlan (2005) shows that reciprocity (i.e., trustworthiness) in trust games predicts subjects’ 
loan repayments one year after a laboratory experiment, and Carpenter and Seki’s work (2005) 
suggests that laboratory measures of conditional cooperation forecast productivity in the 
workplace. Finally, laboratory experiments have long been used by policy makers as a guide, 
i.e. to provide qualitative insights. The Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) used 
laboratory experiments to gain insights into incentive regulation (see Cox and Isaac, 1986 and 
Rassenti and Smith, 1986). Laboratory experiments were then further used as a guide to inform 
electric decentralization/privatization in US, Australia and New Zealand (Rassenti, Smith and 
Wilson, 2002). Therefore, while we do not wish to downplay the importance of field evidence 
on salary negotiations, we also believe that laboratory experiment can be seen as a promising 
first step to shed light on real world issues. 
 
3. Experimental design 
The experiment was conducted at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville (Spain) using z-
Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). It consisted of 12 sessions (four per treatment) with 219 
participants in total, who were recruited online using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). No one was 
allowed to participate in more than one session. The average length of a session was around 70 
minutes and average earnings were 10.95€. 
Our design is a slightly modified version of the game in Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006). 
Participants were randomly assigned a role as either a firm or a worker and the role was fixed 
for the entire duration of the experiment. In each period, a firm was randomly matched with 
two workers. Subjects read the instructions once roles were assigned to participants.7 To make 
sure they understood the instructions, all participants had to answer some questions after 
                                                 
7 The instructions were first read individually and then aloud by the experimenter.  
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finishing the instructions (see Appendix A2 for further details). They could only participate in 
the experiment on successfully answering all questions. The experiment lasted 15 periods. 
The basic structure, common to all treatments, was as follows. In the first stage, the firm 
decided whether to make a wage offer to each worker or not.8,9 In the second stage, workers 
receiving an offer decided whether to accept it or reject it. The surplus was only realized when 
a contract was mutually agreed upon between a worker and a firm. A rejected offer implied 
that neither the firm nor the worker realized any gains. To avoid potential confounding 
regarding reciprocity concerns, workers were homogenous and did not differ in their 
productivity levels. We considered three different experimental treatments: 
 
Baseline (BASE): A firm could make a wage offer, or not, to one or both the workers. 
A worker receiving an offer decides whether to accept it or reject it. Worker information was 
private, and they only knew if they received an offer or not. They could also see their past 
offers. Similarly, a firm could observe the entire history of her own past actions and earnings.  
 
Private proposals (PRIV): Prior to Stage 1 of the BASE, workers first made a private 
“wage proposal” to the firm. Firms knew that the proposals were not binding, and they could 
make an alternate (or no) wage offer. 
 
Public proposals (PUB): The only difference with PRIV is that workers could see the 
co-workers’ past proposals at the end of each period. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Experimental design 
Treatment  Description Time Line 
 
 
Firms could make 0/1/2 
private wage offers in 
 
 
                                                 
8 Following Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006), we frame the instructions as employer, employee and wages (see instructions in 
Appendix A1). 
9 The firm-worker framing is also used in García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012). 
Stage 2 Stage 1 
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Baseline 
(BASE) 
Stage-1. Workers accepted 
or rejected the offers.  
They own past offers. Firms 
saw own past actions and 
worker decisions. 
  
 
 
Private 
Proposals 
(PRIV) 
 
Workers made non-binding 
“wage proposals” to the 
firms before the wage offer 
+ BASE 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Public 
Proposals 
(PUB) 
 
PRIV + workers could see 
all the other workers’ past 
proposals. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Note: There were 4 sessions per treatment, 25 firms and 50 workers in BASE, 24 firms and 48 workers in both 
PRIV and PUB. 
 
If an offer was accepted, the worker received the agreed wage and the firm earned 390 
points (see exchange rates below) minus the wage offer. Earnings for firms and workers are 
summarized in Table 2, where 𝑤𝑖 denotes the wage offer for the worker, 𝑖 = {1, 2}. 
 
Table 2: Payoffs 
Total offers Total surplus Worker 
decision 
Firm Profits Worker 
earnings 
0 0 - 0 0 
1 390 
Accept 390-wi, i=1,2 wi, i=1,2 
Reject 0 0 
2 780 
Accept 780-(w1+w2) wi, i=1,2 
Reject 0 0 
 
At the end of the experiment, participants answered a questionnaire that included age, 
gender, zip code, studies, self-reported fair wage, reasons for wage discrimination (only for 
firms), Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2014), risk aversion (Bomb 
Risk Elicitation Task by Crosetto and Filippin, 2013) and the difficulty to recognize own 
mistakes (for further details on these questions see Appendix A3). The answers to this 
questionnaire allows us to control for subject heterogeneity.  
Worker:  
Accepts/Rejects 
Firm: 
Wage offer 
Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 1 
Worker: 
Wage proposal 
Worker:  
Accepts/Rejects 
Firm: 
Wage offer 
Stage 4 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 1 
Worker: 
Wage proposal 
Worker: 
proposal 
revealed 
Worker:  
Accepts/Rejects 
Firm: 
Wage offer 
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The payoff functions, the number of rounds and the matching protocol were common 
information for participants in all treatments. Everyone was informed that they will be paid for 
one out of the 15 rounds randomly chosen, but they were only informed about their own 
exchange rate at the start of the experiment.10 Exchange rates were set to have comparable 
payoffs across participants. The exchange rate for firms was 1 euro = 17.73 points and 1 euro 
= 21.67 points for workers. 
In all treatments, firms could only see their own wage offers and payoffs for current 
and previous periods at the end of each period. Additionally, under PRIV firms were also 
informed about wage proposals in the current and all previous periods, while workers were 
also informed about their own wage proposals after period one. Finally, in PUB workers were 
informed about the history of the other co-worker’s wage proposals from all past periods for 
that match. 
 
4. The theoretical model 
In this section, we describe a theoretical framework that formalizes the key elements of our 
experiment. This is done to obtain testable hypothesis regarding overall treatment differences. 
Below we describe the basic model and discuss the experimental hypotheses. 
We consider an ultimatum game between a “worker” (he) and a “firm” (she). Let 𝑀 ∈ ℝ+ 
be the endowment to be divided between the two parties. In our basic framework, the firm 
offers a wage to the worker, 𝑤𝑜 ≤ 𝑀, which in turn decides whether to accept or reject. If the 
firm’s offer is accepted, the worker receives 𝑤𝑜 and the firm collects 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑜. If the offer is 
rejected, both parties end up with 0. For simplicity, we assume risk neutrality which involves 
linear utility functions over wealth (i.e., 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑜 for the firm and 𝑤𝑜 for the worker).
11  
Consistent with results in ultimatum games (see Camerer, 2011, pp.48-63 for a review) we 
assume that the worker has a minimum acceptable wage  𝑤𝑚 ≤ 𝑀.
12 Thus, the worker will 
accept (reject) a firm’s offer if 𝑤𝑜 ≥ 𝑤𝑚 (𝑤𝑜 < 𝑤𝑚). The worker’s minimum acceptable wage 
can be of two types, low and high, indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻} where 𝑀 ≥ 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 > 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ≥ 0. We 
                                                 
10 By informing subjects of their exchange rate at the start of the experiment, we are more likely to prevent feelings of 
disappointment and increase their willingness to participate in future experiments (Blount and Bazerman, 1996). 
11 None of the main predictions that we test in our experiment would change if we assumed risk aversion. Only the quantitative 
results might be different. It is easy to check that the wage offer should increase with the firm’s level of risk aversion. 
12 Note that the existence of a minimum acceptable wage is also consistent with previous papers on rules of fairness in the 
workplace (e.g., Akerlof, 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; Bottino, García-Muñoz, Goddio and Kujal, 2016). 
According to this interpretation 𝑤𝑚  represents the worker’s ‘reference wage’, that is, his idiosyncratic idea of a fair 
compensation. 
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denote by 𝑞 the proportion of workers with a low minimum acceptable wage (𝑤𝑚,𝐿) in the 
population.13 
 
3.1. Baseline (BASE) 
We begin by solving the model where the firm does not have any more information about the 
worker’s type other than the commonly known prior (𝑞). This corresponds to our Baseline 
(BASE) treatment. In this case, the firm decides whether to offer a high wage (𝑤𝑜 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) 
that both worker types would accept or, offer a low wage (𝑤𝑜 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) that will be accepted 
only with probability 𝑝. We denote by 𝑇 =
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿
  the firm’s profits from a high offer relative 
to the firm’s profits from a low offer that was accepted. Therefore, 𝑇 < 1 is a measure of the 
relative profitability of making a high wage offer. In the proposition below we provide the 
optimal wage (𝑤0
𝐵𝐴𝑆) and the corresponding expected firm’s profits (Π𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆), expected worker’s 
income (Π𝑊
𝐵𝐴𝑆) and the acceptance rate (𝑟𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸). All proofs are relegated to Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 1 (BASE): The optimal wage offered by the firm, and the corresponding expected 
firm’s profits, expected worker’s income and the acceptance rate are given by:  
𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓   𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻     𝑖𝑓  𝑞 < 𝑇
 ;   𝛱𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {
𝑞(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)     𝑖𝑓   𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻           𝑖𝑓  𝑞 < 𝑇
 
𝛱𝑊
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {
𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓   𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻       𝑖𝑓  𝑞 < 𝑇
;  𝑟𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {
𝑞    𝑖𝑓  𝑞 ≥ 𝑇 
1     𝑖𝑓  𝑞 < 𝑇
 
where 𝑇 =
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿
.  
 
Thus, the firm makes a low offer when the proportion of low types in the population is 
high enough (𝑞 is high) and/or when making a high offer is relatively unprofitable (𝑇 is low), 
otherwise the firm makes a high offer. The low offer would be accepted only with probability 
𝑞, while a high offer would be accepted by all workers. 
 
 
3.2. Private Proposals (PRIV) 
                                                 
13 In a previous version we proposed a general version of this model where the minimum acceptable wage follows a uniform 
continuous distribution (the document is available upon request). Our main qualitative results and predictions were not affected 
by this assumption. We thus focus on the two-type model for the sake of simplicity and clarity of exposition. 
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We now consider a modified version of the ultimatum game in which the worker moves first 
by sending a non-binding wage proposal to the firm, 𝑤𝑝 ≤ 𝑀 . After receiving the wage 
proposal, the firm decides the wage offer. The worker can then accept or reject the firm’s offer. 
Below is the timeline for this game.  
Following insights from the cheap talk literature (see Farrell and Rabin 1996 for a 
review) we study a situation where the wage proposal conveys information about the worker’s 
minimum acceptable wage (𝑤𝑚,𝑖), with the possibility that the worker might be misreporting 
their private information. In particular, we assume that the low type worker’s proposal is their 
minimum acceptable wage (i.e., reports truthfully) with probability 𝜆 ∈ (0,1).14 However, with 
probability 1 − 𝜆 the low type proposes 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 (i.e., she misreports).
15 Therefore, when 
observing a high wage proposal the firm does not know whether the worker is truly a high type, 
or a low type who is misreporting. The assumption that the worker, when proposing a wage to 
the firm, does not always misreport his minimum acceptable wage is consistent with the 
“aversion to lying” literature (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist et al. 2009). Moreover, for 
simplicity, we do not formalize whether it is optimal for the low type worker to misreport or 
not, and simply assume that this occurs with a commonly known probability (1 −  𝜆). 
Note that, in our model, low proposals 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 (which arise with probability 𝜆𝑞) are 
“fully revealing” for the firm, because only a low type who is truthfully reporting would make 
such a low proposal. However, observing 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻  is only “partially revealing” because 
such a proposal might have come from a high type (with probability (1 − 𝑞)) or from a low 
type who is misreporting (with probability 𝑞(1 − 𝜆)). It is easy to see that the firm would 
always meet the worker’s proposal when it is “fully revealing”. If, however, the wage proposal 
is “partially revealing” then the firm needs to consider the trade-off between the benefit of 
offering 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 if the worker is misreporting, and the loss that comes from a rejection if the 
worker’s proposal was his minimum acceptable wage, 𝑤𝑚,𝐻. In other words, the firm decides 
                                                 
14 According to Farrell and Rabin (1996): “[P]eople typically say what they want to have been believed even when the 
incentives clearly imply that cheap talk should not be believed, [that is] some people tell the truth despite incentives to lie” 
(p.104). However, that some people always propose their minimum acceptable wage is not key assumption in our model. Our 
main results would remain unchanged if we assume that everybody misreports, as long as some misreport more than others. 
15 In the continuous version of this model (available upon request) workers can misreport by a factor 𝑏 > 0. The two-type 
model is essentially a particular case of the continuous model where 𝑏 =𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿. The assumption that only the low type 
misreports is also captured in the continuous version because, given that the maximum report is 𝑀, those with a high minimum 
acceptable wage (𝑤𝑚 > 𝑀 − 𝑏) cannot fully misreport; and those with 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑀 will not misreport at all. Therefore, a high 
proposal in the continuous case is more indicative that the worker is not misreporting. Finally, note that in the discrete model, 
results would not be different if we allow the high type to misreport as well; this is because such a misreport will always be 
detected, and hence ignored, by the firm. 
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whether it pays off to believe the worker or not. In the following proposition we summarize 
the results of the private proposals case. 
 
Proposition 2 (PRIV): The optimal wage policy and the corresponding expected firm profits, 
expected worker income and the acceptance rate are given by: 
𝑤𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿   𝑖𝑓   𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉   𝑖𝑓  𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
  where  ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓  ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻    𝑖𝑓   ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇
 ; 
𝛱𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = {
𝑞(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)                                  𝑖𝑓    ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇
𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)  𝑖𝑓   ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇
 
𝛱𝑊
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = {
𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿                                       𝑖𝑓    ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)   𝑖𝑓   ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇
;  𝑟𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = {
𝑞    𝑖𝑓   ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇 
1    𝑖𝑓   ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇
 
where =
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿
 ,  ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = 𝑃(𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) =
(1−𝜆)𝑞
1−𝑞𝜆
< 𝑞,  and ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉  is the optimal 
wage offer conditional on the wage proposal being high. 
 
When a worker first makes a proposal, he is sending a signal to the firm about his 
minimum acceptable wage. While proposing 𝑤𝑚
𝐻 is only partially revealing, it decreases the 
firm’s belief that the worker is low type (i.e., ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑞). As a result, when the proposal is 
high, the firm is less likely to offer a low wage offer in PRIV than in BASE. Consequently, 
expected worker’s income should increase with proposals. However, as we show in the 
corollary below, because acceptance rates will be higher, firms’ might also be strictly better 
off under proposals. 
Corollary 1 (PRIV vs. BASE): Comparing the results when private proposals are available 
(PRIV) with the results without proposals (BASE), we find that: 
𝑤𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸; 𝛱𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝛱𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸; 𝛱𝑊
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝛱𝑊
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 and 𝑟𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑟𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 
 
3.3. Public Proposals (PUB) 
We now proceed to discuss an extension of the previous model where workers are informed 
about a co-worker’s previous wage proposal. We assume that after a first period with private 
proposals, there is a second period where the worker learns about the proposal made by the co-
worker in the previous period16. The extension allows us to consider the possibility that workers 
                                                 
16 This structure resembles the PUB treatment in our experiment. 
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change their proposal to conform to others’. Social psychologists refer to conformity as “the 
act of changing one’s behavior to match the responses of others” (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004, 
p. 606). Conformity is not only widespread, but also at the root of important findings in the 
economic literature (see, e.g., Bernheim, 1994; Clark and Oswald, 1998; Sliwka, 2007; Thöni 
and Gächter, 2015).17 
We capture conformity in our model by assuming that a worker’s proposal in PUB will 
mimic the co-worker’s previous proposal. Therefore, instead of being purely random, the low 
type worker’s decision to misreport in PUB is affected by the co-workers’ previous proposal. 
However, although a low type (i.e., 𝑤𝑚,𝐿), observes a high proposal by his co-worker, this 
worker will keep his type fixed. Moreover, our notion of conformity also implies that when a 
worker, who was initially of the high type (i.e., 𝑤𝑚,𝐻), is informed of  a low proposal, i.e. 
𝑤𝑝,𝑐 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿, the worker will then also make a similar low wage proposal (𝑤𝑝
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿). 
This, in effect, makes the worker a low type because, in our model, he cannot reject an offer 
that meets his proposal. 18  Thus, although both types of workers mimic their co-workers 
proposals, only high types indeed change their type (to low). 
In the following figure, we show that the worker’s proposal, given his initial minimum 
acceptable wage (and type), has a low minimum acceptable wage in PUB and all possible 
subsequent matches. From Figure 3 we can compute the total probability of the worker being 
of low type in PUB:  𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≔ 𝑃(𝑤𝑚
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) = 𝑞(1 + (1 − 𝑞)𝜆) > 𝑞 . Therefore, our 
notion of conformity implies that there will be more low type workers in PUB than in PRIV, 
which is a key driver of the results in this section. In the following proposition we summarize 
the results for the public proposal case. 
                                                 
17 Conformity is a type of “social influence”: the fact that a person’s emotions, opinions or behaviors are affected by others. 
There are two types of conformity, “normative influence” is often used to refer to situations in which individuals are susceptible 
to social influence in order to conform to or identify with others (Festinger, Schachter and Back, 1950; Asch, 1953; Cai, Chen 
and Fang, 2009; and Fatas, Heap and Arjona, 2018). Alternatively, “informational influence” (also known as “social proof”) 
is used to describe social influence in a context in which the behavior of others is useful in order to infer inaccessible 
information about an objective state of the world (Banerjee 1992; Anderson and Holt, 1997; Goeree and Yariv, 2015; and 
Muchnik, Aral and Taylor, 2013). In this paper, we are agnostic about what type of conformism is more likely to affect 
subjects’ behaviour (but they are not mutually exclusive). Thus, our assumption is that people conform but we do not enter 
into the reasons why people conform.  
18 Note that, for simplicity, we are assuming that neither firms nor workers are forward looking and hence the results in PRIV 
are unaffected by adding a new interaction in PUB. 
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Figure 3. Worker’s proposal (and type) in PUB given own and co-worker’s previous proposal. 
Proposition 3 (PUB). The optimal wage policy and the corresponding expected firm’s profits, 
expected worker’s income and acceptance rates are given by: 
𝑤𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿   𝑖𝑓   𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵   𝑖𝑓  𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
  where  ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓   ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻    𝑖𝑓 ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇
 ; 
Π𝐹
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)     𝑖𝑓   ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇
𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)  𝑖𝑓  ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇
 
Π𝑊
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓   ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)   𝑖𝑓  ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇
;  𝑟𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵    𝑖𝑓  ?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇 
1       𝑖𝑓  ?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇 
 
where 𝑇 =
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿
,  𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑃(𝑤𝑚
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) = 𝑞(1 + (1 − 𝑞)𝜆) > 𝑞 , ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑃(𝑤𝑚
𝑃𝑈𝐵 =
𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) =
1−𝜆𝑞
1−𝜆𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵
> ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉, and ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵 is the optimal wage offer conditional on 
the wage proposal being high. 
We can use Propositions 1-3 to compare results across our three treatments. In the next 
corollary, we focus on the most interesting case in which the firm finds it optimal to 
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discriminate between proposals in PRIV; while the wage offer in PUB and BASE can be 
rejected. 
Corollary 2 (PUB vs. PRIV vs. BASE). If 𝑇 ∈ (?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 , 𝑞] then: 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 > 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 = ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸; 
In this case, we have, 
Π𝐹
𝑃𝑈𝐵 > Π𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ Π𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 
Π𝑊
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 > Π𝑊
𝑃𝑈𝐵 > Π𝑊
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 
𝑟𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = 1 > 𝑟𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑟𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 
Therefore, under the conditions of Corollary 2 we obtain a clear ranking of outcomes 
in the three cases (BASE, PRIV and PUB). First, for firms, we expect the highest profits in 
PUB and the lowest profits in BASE with PRIV in the middle. As we showed in Section 3.2, 
worker proposals can promote higher wages, profits, and overall efficiency when they provide 
information about the worker’s type. In addition, as we have shown in this section, there will 
be a higher proportion of workers with low minimum acceptable wages in the population 
(𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞) when proposals are made public, which are the type of workers most profitable for 
the firm. Because of the same reason, we also expect higher worker incomes (i.e., accepted 
wages) under private proposals. Finally, the condition of Corollary 2 ensures that while every 
worker would accept the firm offer under private proposals, high type workers would reject it 
in PUB and in BASE. However, since there are less high type workers in PUB, the acceptance 
rate will be higher than in BASE. 
Corollary 3 (Income inequality across treatments). If 𝑇 ∈ (?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 , 𝑞] then,  
(i) Conditional on the wage offer being accepted, income inequality among workers is 
higher in PRIV than in PUB and BASE. 
(ii) Worker’s income, as a share of the total surplus, is higher in PRIV than in PUB and 
BASE. 
Corollary 3 follows from the result that the firm offers higher wages to those who ask for 
it only under private proposals. While workers receive low wage offers regardless of their 
proposals in PUB or BASE (see Corollary 2). It follows then than under private proposals, the 
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percentege of accepted high wages should be higher (Corollary 3.1) and worker’s should be 
able to get a higher share of the total surplus (Corollary 3.2) than in the other two conditions.   
3.4. Testable Predictions 
In this section, we provide testable predictions for our experiments. In our theory, wage 
proposals convey (imperfect) information about the worker’s minimum acceptable wage; 
therefore, firms would, on average, offer higher wages to those making higher proposals. Our 
results also indicate that, because workers can misreport, the firm’s optimal policy is 
sometimes to ignore high proposals and offer a low wage instead. 
Hypothesis 1: (wage offers and proposals) 
(i) We expect firms’ wage-offers to increase in the workers’ proposals. 
(ii) We expect average wage proposals to be higher than average wage-offers. 
(iii) We expect average wage-offers to be higher under proposals. 
Our notion of conformity (see Figure 3) implies that the probability that a low-type worker 
reports their minimum acceptable wage is  𝜆𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑞(𝜆𝑞) + (1 − 𝑞)(𝜆𝑞) < 𝜆. Therefore, we 
expect more misreporting in PUB than in PRIV. On the other hand, our notion of conformity 
also implies that there will be more low type workers under public proposals and hence workers 
will be more likely to accept lower wages in PUB than in PRIV and, as we showed in Corollary 
2, this will promote firms to offer lower wages in PUB than in PRIV. 
Hypothesis 2: (Conformity) 
(i) We expect similar wage proposals in PUB and PRIV. 
(ii) We expect higher accepted wages in PRIV than in PUB. 
(iii) We expect higher wage offers in PRIV than in PUB. 
Under the condition of Corollary 2 we can also make some predictions about how proposals 
affect firm’s profits, worker’s income and acceptance rates (and hence overall efficiency).  
Hypothesis 3: (Welfare effects) 
(i) We expect workers’ income to have the following ranking: PRIV > PUB > BASE. 
(ii) We expect firms’ profits to have the following ranking: PUB > PRIV > BASE. 
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(iii) We expect acceptance rates (and hence overall efficiency) to be higher under both 
PRIV and PUB proposals than in BASE. 
Finally, Corollary 3 also predicts results about income equality. 
Hypothesis 4 (Income inequality) 
(i) We expect the share of workers in total surplus to have the following ranking: PRIV 
> PUB and BASE. 
(ii) Conditional on the wage offer being accepted, income equality among workers is 
higher in PUB and BASE than in PRIV. 
 
5.  Results 
We use both nonparametric statistics and econometric analysis to test our hypotheses. 
Nonparametric tests (Mann-Whitney one-tailed tests unless otherwise stated) are considered at 
an individual level to ensure independence. Observations for each individual are averaged for 
the 15 experimental rounds. To be more conservative with the independence hypothesis non-
parametric tests are also conducted at the session level. The econometric analysis (while 
controlling for additional effects) is conducted using both Random Effects (RE hereafter) Logit 
and Generalized Least Squared (GLS hereafter) models. We first study wages and proposals 
with their acceptance rates. This is followed by welfare effects and income equality. Finally, 
though, we have a limited number of observations for firms, we also explore gender 
differences. 
5.1. Wages and proposals 
Figure 2 shows firms’ (wage) offers and workers’ (wage) proposals over time for PRIV and 
PUB. The relationship of those two variables is positive with correlation coefficient of 0.544 
(p < 0.01) for PRIV and 0.452 (p < 0.01) for PUB. This confirms Hypothesis 1(i) that the wage 
offers increase in the wage proposals. Proposals and wage offers, under both PRIV and PUB, 
have a positive trend over time. Interestingly, as the experiment progresses, the gap between 
workers’ proposals and firms’ wage offers is increasing under PUB and is greater than under 
PRIV. This might be because firms learn over time that, as predicted by our theory, workers 
are less likely to reject low wage offers in PUB than in PRIV. Note that there is no apparent 
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difference between the proposals under PRIV and PUB, however, wage offers under PUB are 
flatter. This is reflected in the lower correlation coefficient (0.452) between proposals and wage 
offers under PUB. 
 
Figure 2: Average wage proposals and firms’ wage offers over time  
 
 
 
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for wage offers and proposals. Differences 
between proposals and wage offers are positive on average (75.92 for PRIV and 88.44 for 
PUB). We cannot, however, consider that wage proposals and wage offers are independent. 
Thus, we conduct a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and find that proposals are 
statistically higher than wage offers in each period (PRIV: maximum p < 0.001; PUB: 
maximum p < 0.001).  This supports Hypothesis 1 (ii). In Figure 2 above, we can see that this 
result holds in all 15 periods for both treatments.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1 (iii), we see 
that wage offers by firms are higher (see Table 3) when workers can submit wage proposals 
(PRIV and PUB) compared to the baseline (PRIV-BASE: z = -3.001, p < 0.001; PUB-BASE: 
z = -0.917, p = 0.017). 
Next, we focus on the prediction that workers’ proposals are affected by a conformity effect in 
PUB (Hypothesis 2). As predicted by Hypothesis 2 (i), wage proposals are very similar in PUB 
and PRIV (235.43 vs. 234.66, p = 0.956, two-tailed test). Moreover, in line with Hypothesis 2 
(ii), accepted wages in PUB (158.96) are lower than in PRIV (177.17) and this difference is 
significant (p =0.003). In fact, our notion of conformity also implies that  workers should 
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misreport more (i.e., propose more than they would accept) in PUB than in PRIV. We find 
evidence in line with this effect as the difference between proposals and accepted wages is 
higher in PUB (74.92) than in PRIV (55.38) (z = -4.159; p < 0.000). Importantly, firms seem 
to be aware of this effect, because despite observing similar wage proposals, they offer lower 
wages in PUB (152.77) than in PRIV (170.04); a result supporting Hypothesis 2 (iii) (p 
=0.019). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for average wages and proposals 
 BASE PRIV PUB 
% Accepted offers 75% 86% 87% 
Wage offers by firms 144.79 170.04 152.77 
Accepted wages by workers 160.42 177.17 158.96 
Wage proposals by workers - 235.43 234.66 
Proposals – accepted wages - 55.38 74.92 
N(firms/workers) 25/50 24/48 24/48 
Table 4 presents a series of RE Generalized Least Squares regressions where the 
dependent variable is the average wage offer made by firms.19 The first explanatory variable, 
given the strong relationship observed in Figure 2 above, is workers’ proposal, computed as 
the average of the two proposals for the workers-firm pair in a given period. To control for 
heterogeneity, as it is usual in laboratory experiments, we use some of the variables extracted 
from our post-questionnaire (see experimental section): female, a dummy with value 1 if the 
firm is female and 0 otherwise; risk lover, a categorical variable that is 0 if the firm is risk 
averse, 1 if risk neutral and 2 if risk lover; self-reported fair wage, that is, firms’ subjective 
opinion about what they considered to be a fair wage in a post-questionnaire; high income, a 
dummy with value 1 if the subject is among the 25% of the subjects living in areas with higher 
per capita income and 0 otherwise. We also consider the period to control for time trends and 
the dummies for the BASE and the PRIV treatments.  
                                                 
19 Results qualitatively hold if the dependent variable is the wage offer made by firms to each worker. 
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We test Hypothesis 1 in specifications 1 and 2. The coefficient associated with worker 
proposals is positive and significant for both PRIV (0.412, p<0.01) and PUB (0.272, p<0.01). 
Higher proposals result in higher wage offers and this is independent of whether the proposal 
is private or public. It is worthwhile to note that the size of the effect under PRIV is much 
higher than under PUB. This is line with our theoretical model where workers in PUB are 
affected by conformity and hence, compared to PRIV, they are more likely to make proposals 
similar to their co-workers. We check this effect by looking at the difference in proposals (for 
the same firm) for PRIV and PUB. We find that, in line with our conjectures, the average 
difference in proposals received by each firm in PUB (68.73) is significantly lower than in 
PRIV (80.07) (-2.228, p < 0.013).  
 
Table 4: RE GLS regressions on wage offers by firms 
 
 
 PRIV PUB BASE vs PRIV BASE vs PUB PRIV vs PUB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Worker proposals  0.412*** 0.272*** -9.678 -7.688 0.323*** 
 (0.055) (0.044) (10.440) (9.398) (0.035) 
Female -1.844 12.076 -4.273 -3.508 3.217 
 (12.384) (10.996) (4.361) (4.172) (8.383) 
Risk lover -3.472 -10.004* 0.151  0.209** -6.198 
 (6.308) (5.298) (0.105) (0.089) (4.110) 
Self-reported fair 
wage 
-0.044 
(0.071) 
0.198*** 
(0.076) 
11.270    
(9.700) 
6.187   
(10.460) 
 
High income 17.059* -2.883      1.691*** 0.715 6.633 
 (9.314) (9.851) (0.579) (0.489) (7.142) 
Period  1.392** -0.336   -21.540** -8.270 0.582 
 
BASE 
(0.624) (0.711) (10.29) 
-21.642** 
(10.289) 
(9.070) 
-8.27 
(9.07) 
(0.482) 
PRIV     12.38* 
     (6.593) 
Constant 66.686*** 62.467**     129.500***    112.400*** 76.37*** 
 (19.73) (17.223) (20.64) (17.50) (10.97) 
R-squared 0.188 0.314 0.225 0.221 0.176 
Observations 358 359 732 733 717 
            Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Next, we make pairwise comparisons between treatments. Specification (3) confirms 
that wage offers were significantly higher in PRIV than in BASE. Although, wages were higher 
in PUB, they were not significantly different between BASE and PUB (see dummy BASE in 
specification (4) of Table 4). Our econometric analysis thus finds strong support for Hypothesis 
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1(i), (ii) and partly for (iii) (though higher, average wage offers under PUB are not significantly 
different than BASE). We state Result 1 below based on Hypothesis 1: 
 
Result 1.  
i) Firms’ wage-offers increase with workers’ wage-proposals. 
ii) On average, wage-proposals are higher than wage offers. 
iii) Compared to BASE, wage-offers are higher in PRIV and PUB, but only the former 
difference is statistically significant.  
Finally, in specification (5) of Table 4, we confirm that Hypothesis 2 (iii) still holds when 
we control for other effects (see coefficient 12.38 of the PRIV dummy). We summarize our 
results for Hypothesis 2 as follows: 
 
Result 2.  
i) Wage proposals are similar in PRIV and PUB. 
ii) Accepted wages are higher in PRIV than in PUB. 
iii) Wage-offers are higher in PRIV than in PUB.  
 
5.2. Profits, Efficiency and Income Inequality 
In Table 5, we report descriptive statistics for firm and worker earnings, and income inequality. 
Relative to the baseline, workers’ earnings are higher under both, PRIV and PUB, proposals 
(PRIV-BASE: z = -4.864, p < 0.001; PUB-BASE: z = -2.615, p = 0.004). Moreover, workers 
earn slightly more under PRIV than under PUB (PRIV-PUB: z = 1.568, p = 0.059). This 
supports Hypothesis 3 (i). Interestingly, relative to the baseline, firm profits are higher for 
public and private proposals. The difference, however, is only significant for PUB (z = -2.680, 
p = 0.004) and not for PRIV (z = -0.160, p = 0.873, two-tails). Moreover, the highest profits 
for firms are attained when proposal are public (PRIV-PUB: z = -3.103; p = 0.001). Thus, in 
line with Hypothesis 3 (ii) PUB is the most favourable treatment for firms. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for profits, efficiency and income inequality  
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 BASE PRIV PUB 
 
Firms’ earnings 
 
334.90 
 
347.63 390.12 
Workers’ earnings 
 
116.14 
 
144.69 134.45 
Total earnings 
 
568.88 635.69 658.67 
Acceptance rates 
 
75% 86% 87% 
Workers’ surplus 
share 
20% 22% 20% 
Gini Index: Overall 
 
0.450 0.318 0.364 
Gini Index: workers 0.172 0.157 0.164 
N(firms/workers) 25/50 24/48 24/48 
Efficiency is only impacted in our framework if a contract between a worker and firm 
is not realized. This can occur if a worker rejects a wage offer or if a firm makes no wage offer 
to a worker. In both cases, workers and firms would get zero earnings, resulting in a deadweight 
loss and lower total surplus (efficiency). We find that acceptance rates are higher (by 
approximately 10%) both under PRIV and PUB (PRIV-BASE: z =-2.566, p = 0.005; PUB-
BASE: z = -3.186, p < 0.001). This result is consistent with our theoretical framework 
(Hypothesis 3(iii)) where proposals lead not only to higher wage offers (Hypothesis 1(iii)) but 
also, in the case of PUB, to a higher chance that the worker would accept a low offer (i.e., of 
being a “low type”). Finally, overall efficiency does not appear to be different in PUB or PRIV 
(PRIV-PUB: z = 1.043, p = 0.297, two-tailed test)20. 
We next test Hypothesis 4 by looking at the impact of proposals on income inequality. 
First, we observe that although efficiency is higher and wages increase when proposals are 
present, workers’ share in total surplus declines when proposals are public (vs private) (p = 
0.024). In fact, and due to the lower proportion of low types in PUB, workers’ share in BASE 
and PUB are not statistically different (p = 0.223, two-tails). These results support Hypothesis 
4 (i). Next, we consider two additional measures of inequality for all our treatments: overall 
inequality in the system (i.e., Gini index-overall), which measures how unequal are overall 
                                                 
20 These results are confirmed by the analogous tests at a session level (PRIV-BASE: p = 0.011, PUB-BASE: p = 0.011; PUB-
PRIV: p = 0.309, two-tails).  
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outcomes for both workers and firms, and inequality across workers (Gini index-workers).21 
Thus, the first measure captures inequality between firms and workers, while the second 
measure focuses on inequality only across workers. Moreover, to be consistent with our 
Hypothesis 4 (ii), we will compute the Gini index only for accepted offers22. 
We obtain the highest (overall) income inequality in BASE (0.450) relative to PRIV 
(0.318) and PUB (0.364) (see Gini index-overall variable on Table 5). This result is even more 
striking given that our workers are homogenous, and labor is the only input. We expect these 
results to be stronger if we include heterogeneity in skill or productivity levels of workers. Our 
first take from this is that allowing for proposals decreases overall inequality, while, making 
them public increases it slightly. Regarding income inequality only among workers, we observe 
a slightly different result. We find that the Gini index-worker is the lower in PRIV (0.157) than 
PUB (0.164) and BASE (0.172). Thus, making proposals decreases income inequality among 
workers. These results are only partially consistent with Hypothesis 4 (ii). While our results 
support the theoretical prediction that making proposals public create a more equal distribution 
of wages relative to BASE, they are inconsistent with our prediction that PRIV should be the 
most unequal treatment. Instead, our results show that BASE is the most unequal treatment. 
One possible explanation for this is that, in contrast to our simplifying assumption of 
commonly known priors in BASE, firms in our experiments might have had very different pre-
conceived ideas about the workers’ minimum acceptable wage. If that is the case, it is likely 
that wage proposals would decrease inequality in wage offers (and hence in workers earnings) 
by providing a clearer (if perhaps noisy) signal of the worker’s type.  
Below, we further conduct some econometric regressions to check the robustness of the 
previous results on profits, efficiency and income inequality. First, Table 6 contains four RE 
GLS regressions where the dependent variables are workers’ earnings (columns 1- 3) and 
firms’ profits (columns 4-6). The set of independent variables are the same as in Table 5 but 
now we include a dummy variable to control for treatment effects, PRIV. Notice that in 
                                                 
21 Note that there are several ways to compute the Gini index since we have 15 observations per subject. We compute the Gini 
index as the average of the 15 periods. We believe this is the best way to capture income inequality since profits and inequality 
evolves over time and the reference point should be considered within each period. 
22 A remark is in order here. Even though we use proposals, we feel they work as a proxy for the disclosure of wages. In fact, 
the public disclosure of proposals is weaker than the public disclosure of wages where we can expect a stronger effect. Our 
main question will be to study how private and public proposals impact wage inequality (if they do). 
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specifications 1 to 3 all the covariates will refer to workers’ characteristics. Thus, worker 
proposals in specifications 4-6 refers to the average wage proposals made by the workers paired 
with the corresponding firm.  We confirm that workers’ profits are higher under proposals. 
Looking at Table 6, we find that in both cases the coefficients associated with BASE are 
negative and significant (-25.536 when compared to PRIV and -17.435 when compared to 
PUB). Nevertheless, there are no significant differences in workers’ earnings between private 
or public proposals. Thus, we find the same results as before. 
Table 6: RE GLS regressions on workers’ and firms’ profits  
 BASE and 
PRIV 
BASE and 
PUB 
PRIV and 
PUB 
BASE and 
PRIV 
BASE and 
PUB 
PRIV and 
PUB 
 (1) workers (2) workers (3) workers (4) firms (5) firms (6) firms 
Female 0.309 13.277** -4.793 -24.826 -18.938 -10.48 
 (5.545) (6.039) (6.247) (17.839) (16.646) (14.52) 
Risk lover - - - 9.307 4.453 -0.208 
    (7.354) (8.073) (6.286) 
Self-reported                                     0.126*** 0.106** 0.142** -0.193 -0.204 -0.120* 
Fair-wage (0.044) (0.045) (0.057) (0.163) (0.142) (0.070) 
High income -13.478** 6.426 -5.266 7.653 15.630 5.597 
 (6.543) (6.183) (7.211) (14.583) (15.738) (12.69) 
Worker’s 
proposal 
- - 0.146*** 
(0.037) 
- - -0.743***  
(0.097) 
Period     2.605*** 1.371*** 2.132*** 1.641 2.156* 3.033*** 
 (0.451) (0.399) (0.456) (1.267) (1.245) (1.018) 
BASE -25.536*** 
(5.178) 
-17.435*** 
(5.687) 
- 
 
-20.432 
(16.427) 
-50.638*** 
(15.711) 
- 
 
PRIV - - 4.852 - - -36.61*** 
   (6.542)   (14.01) 
Constant 95.608*** 90.947*** 57.40*** 380.453*** 08.203*** 564.9*** 
 (10.717) (10.126) (11.15) (34.916) (29.833) (24.11) 
R-squared 0.317 0.211 0.272 0.149 0.285 0.284 
Observations 1470 1470 1470 735 735 735 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Looking at firm earnings ((3) to (6)) (where all covariates refer to firms’ 
characteristics), we find that, although they are higher under proposals, this effect is only 
significant when proposals are public. That is, firms’ profits are significantly higher in PUB 
than in PRIV (see coefficient of PRIV in (6)). This is also what we found with the non-
parametric statistical tests. Hypothesis 3 (ii) is thus supported except that PUB and PRIV are 
not significantly different, while Hypothesis 3(ii) is also partially supported with the exception 
of the relationship of BASE and PRIV.  
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Next, we focus on efficiency. Table 7 presents a series of RE GLS regressions where 
the dependent variable is efficiency (1 if two contracts are accepted, 0.5 if only one worker 
accepted the offer and, 0 when no contract is accepted). We consider an additional dummy for 
the PRIV treatment. We compare PRIV and BASE in specification (1) and PUB and BASE in 
specification (2). Clearly, efficiency in BASE is significantly lower than in PUB or PRIV (see 
coefficient of BASE dummy in specifications (1) and (2)). However, efficiency is not 
significantly different in PUB and PRIV (see coefficient of PRIV dummy in specification (3)) 
when controlling for other explanatory variables and exploiting all the information of the panel 
data structure. Thus, Hypothesis 3 (iii) is again supported. 
 
Table 7: RE GLS regressions on efficiency  
 BASE and PRIV BASE and PUB PRIV and PUB 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Female -0.066 -0.049 -0.005 
 (0.049) (0.040) (0.038) 
Risk lover 0.003 -0.003 -0.024 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) 
Self-reported fair wage 0.00004 0.0002 0.035 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.030) 
High income 0.044 0.040 0.0001 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.0002) 
Period  0.009*** 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
BASE -0.096** -0.111***  
 (0.044) (0.04)  
PRIV   -0.039 
   (0.035) 
Constant 0.763*** 
     (0.092) 
0.766*** 
(0.072) 
 
0.788*** 
(0.051) 
R-squared 0.137 0.192 0.105 
Observations 735 735 720 
                       Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next, we turn our attention to income inequality. In Table 9, we analyse it among 
workers using a RE GLS model where we consider two dependent variables. For specifications 
(1) to (3), the dependent variable is the distance between each workers income in a period 
minus the average incomes of all the workers in that period and treatment in absolute value 
but, restricted to those cases where there was an offer and it was accepted. For specifications 
(4) to (6), the dependent variable is the distance between each workers income in a period 
minus the average profits of all the workers and firms in that treatment in absolute value. 
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Table 9: RE GLS on the distance between workers’ earnings and average earnings of all 
workers; and the distance between average earnings of all workers and firms in a treatment. 
 Only workers Workers and firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
BASE and 
PRIV 
BASE and 
PUB 
PRIV and 
PUB 
BASE and 
PRIV 
BASE and 
PUB 
PRIV and 
PUB 
Female -8.172** -7.117** -7.366** -0.309 -13.280** 6.699 
 (3.837) (3.494) (3.266) (5.546) (6.039) (6.485) 
High income -1.036 0.874 1.793 13.480** -6.426 5.322 
 
(3.810) (3.414) (3.719) 
(6.543) (6.183) (7.503) 
Self-reported 
fair wage 
0.063**  
(0.031) 
0.070**   
(0.029) 
0.152*** 
(0.026) 
-0.126*** 
(0.044) 
0.106** 
(0.045) 
-0.219*** 
(0.424) 
 
Period    
                         
-1.254*** 
 
-1.172*** 
 
-0.545** 
 
-2.605*** 
 
-1.371*** 
 
-2.906*** 
 (0.288) (0.269) (0.266) (0.451) (0.399) (0.272) 
BASE 8.226** 11.68***  -43.470*** -74.110***  
 (3.573) (3.222)  (5.178) (5.687)  
PRIV   1.517   -25.100*** 
   (3.377)   (6.817) 
       
Constant 45.200*** 38.39*** 15.670*** 540.50*** 567.70*** 588.60*** 
 (7.884) (7.065) (5.900) (10.72) (10.13) (11.71) 
R-squared  0.125 0.278 0.283 0.086 0.200 0.199 
       
Observations 1,135 1,156 1,197 1470 1470 1440 
  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
First, if we focus on income inequality only amongst workers, we find that inequality 
is significantly higher in BASE relative to PRIV and PUB treatments (see coefficient of the 
dummy BASE in (1) and (2)). However, income inequality is not significantly different for 
public or private proposals (see coefficient of the dummy PRIV in (3)). Thus, the econometric 
analysis supports Hypothesis 4 (ii) partially (except for PUB and PRIV that are not significantly 
different).23 When we analyze inequality in overall terms ((4) to (6)), we observe that income 
inequality is significantly lower in BASE than in PUB or PRIV. This result clearly contradicts 
what we found in Table 5 according to the Gini index (overall). The most plausible explanation 
is that even though workers earn higher wages with proposals, this effect is dominated by the 
increase in firms’ earnings due to higher acceptance rates in the presence of proposals. Finally, 
when proposals are private income inequality is lower that when they are public. This is in line 
                                                 
23 Table C1 in Appendix C reports similar results when we measure income inequality as the proportion from the total surplus 
earned by firms. 
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what we found in Table 5 above. We summarize our findings in Result 3 (Hypothesis 3) and 
Result 4 (Hypothesis 4) below: 
Result 3.  
i) Workers earn more under proposals (PUB and PRIV) relative to BASE.  
ii) Relative to BASE, proposals increase firms’ profits under proposals. There are no 
significant differences in proposals between PRIV and PUB 
iii) Acceptance rates (and therefore efficiency) are higher under proposals.  Although, 
efficiency is the highest under public proposals, this is not significant when controlling 
for other effects. 
 
Result 4:   
i) Workers’ share of total surplus is higher in PRIV than in PUB or BASE. Income 
inequality measured through the Gini index is the highest in BASE.  
ii) Income inequality among workers, conditional on the wage-offer to be accepted, is 
higher in BASE than in PUB or PRIV.  
 
5.3. Gender Analysis  
Our experiment also provides some interesting results regarding gender effects that we discuss 
in this section. We begin by summarizing the key papers in this literature and discuss how they 
relate to our experiment. We then use these findings to provide an empirical hypothesis 
regarding gender effects in our experiment. We finish by testing this hypothesis with our 
experiment results.  
The experimental literature on gender differences in negotiation presents mixed results. 
Eckel and Grossman (2001) used the ultimatum game to study the gender gap in an 
environment where participants know their partner’s gender (opposite to our setting). They 
found that compared to men, women’s wage offers are higher, while, as second movers, they 
are also more likely to accept wages. Solnick (2001) performs an ultimatum game experiment 
with two treatments, one where the partner’s gender is known and another when it is unknown. 
Similar to Eckel and Grossman’s results, he found that when gender is salient, males receive 
higher offers. By contrast, there are no gender differences in wage offers when the gender of 
the partner is unknown. However, in contrast to Eckel and Grossman’s findings, females were 
more likely to reject offers. A possible explanation for these different results is that Solnick’s 
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experiment followed the strategy method and hence the impact of rejection decisions on the 
overall outcome is less obvious.  
García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) also study gender 
differences in an ultimatum game. However, in their setup participants don´t know their 
partner’s gender. They have three treatments and in two of them workers have to perform a 
real effort task. We focus on the treatment where there is no real effort task. Though not 
significant, and contrary to Eckel and Grossman (2001), they find that women offer less and 
reject more they find that. As we did not inform subjects about their partner’s gender or use 
the strategy method, our work is more closely related to García-Gallego, Georgantzís and 
Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012). Finally, in what it is perhaps the most related experimental paper, 
Rigdon (2012) uses a Demand Ultimatum Game where partner’s gender was unknown. She 
finds that, when proposals are made privately, females make significantly lower wage 
proposals than males and accept wage offers more frequently. However, the gender gap 
disappears when proposals were made public. Note that, Rigdon’s environment is related to 
our PRIV and PUB treatments. 24 Based on the findings of this literature, we state the following 
empirical hypothesis: 
 
Empirical hypothesis G: Gender 
(i) Compared to males, female workers will make lower wage proposals in PRIV but 
similar in PUB (Rigdon, 2012). 
(ii) Compared to males, female firms will make similar wage offers in BASE (García-
Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, 2012) but lower in PRIV and similar in 
PUB (Rigdon 2012). 
(iii) Compared to males, female workers’ acceptance rates will be similar in BASE (García-
Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, 2012) but higher in PRIV and similar in 
PUB (Rigdon, 2012). 
 
Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics by gender for each treatment. Although, not 
statistically significant (p = 0.415, two-tails) we observe that in line with Hypothesis G (ii), 
                                                 
24 There is also an extensive literature on gender and negotiation which is not so close to our setting either because the partner’s 
gender is known or because the game is not an Ultimatum Game: Dittrich, Knabe and Leipold (2014) use a face-to-face 
alternating-offers wage bargaining environment and they find that male workers receive on average higher wage offers. Also, 
male workers ask higher salaries than females when they make a counteroffer to firms. Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2018), 
in a real word TV negotiation game, find that when the strong bargaining position is held by men, and they bargain against 
women responders, men are more likely to take a larger share of the pie. Meanwhile, women demand less from men than from 
women.  
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wage offers are 12% lower for females than males in BASE. Additionally, in line with this 
hypothesis, we do not find gender differences in wage offers when proposals are present 
(PRIV: 172.27 vs 169.15; PUB: 152.62 vs. 152.89) (PRIV: p = 0.634 and PUB: p = 0.655, 
two-tails).25 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics by gender 
 
 BASE PRIV PUB 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
% Accepted offers 64% 84% 86% 85% 81% 91% 
Wage offers 152.39 136.33 172.27 169.15 152.62 152.89 
Accepted wages 167.17 155.60 183.63 169.96 161.10 157.58 
Proposals 
 
- - 243.45 226.71 227.41 239.85 
Firms’ profits 
 
353.17 315.11 357.56 343.53 
 
388.54 392.76 
Workers’ income 105.41 
 
127.68 
 
151.8 
 
136.95 128.34 
 
138.82 
  N 
(firms/workers) 
 
13/24 
 
12/26 
 
7/25 
 
17/23 
 
15/20 
 
9/28 
 
We do not find any differences for average wage proposals (PRIV: p = 0.353; PUB: p 
= 0.347), a result that it is only partially in line with Hypothesis G (i).26  Although not 
statistically significant, it seems that, compared to men, women make lower proposals in PRIV, 
but higher in PUB, a result consistent with Rigdon’s (2012) finding that women are more 
assertive in wage negotiations when they have access to public information. Indeed, if we 
explore the evolution over time of these variables (Figure 3), we observe that average wage 
proposals by women are below those of men in every period when proposals are private (Figure 
3a)), while the opposite happens when proposals are public (Figure 3b)). 
 
Figure 3: Evolution in time of wage proposals by male and female workers  
a) Private proposals                              b) Public proposals 
                                                 
25 In fact, this result also holds if we consider data just from the first 5 periods (BASE: p = 0.211; PRIV: p = 
0.949, two-tails) except for PUB where the difference is weakly significant and male started with offers slightly 
higher than women (PUB:  p = 0.080). 
26 Again, this result also holds if we consider data just from the first 5 periods (PRIV: p = 0.279, two-tails; PUB:  
p = 0.490, two-tails). 
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Regarding acceptance rates, female workers accept significantly more offers than males 
in BASE (p < 0.001), a result that supports Hypothesis G (iii).27 Compared to males, females 
also have higher acceptance rates in PUB (p = 0.018), but similar in PRIV (p = 0.902, two-
tails). This is consistent with the second part of Hypothesis G (iii). Therefore, our results 
support Hypothesis G (iii). Finally, we do not find significant gender differences in firm profits 
or worker income except in BASE where female workers receive higher income than males, a 
result that follows the female’s higher acceptance rates.28 We summarize our findings on 
gender below: 
Result 5 
In the absence of proposals (BASE), we find gender differences in rejection rates, workers’ 
profits and efficiency. With the exception of rejection rates, these differences disappear when 
private (PRIV) and public (PUB) proposals are present. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have experimentally and theoretically studied the impact of pre-play 
communication and information in a labour relationship. Pre-play communication is observed 
in many job negotiations but their impact in wage formation is little understood. Further, 
providing information on salaries has recently been explored in many countries and the 
European Union29 in an attempt to make the labour markets more transparent. In our main 
                                                 
27  Note that García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) find that women reject more although not 
significantly. We get the opposite, women reject (quantitatively) less but not significantly. A possible explanation is that 
García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) consider a fixed matching while we consider a random one. 
28 For firms’ profits: p = 0.889 in BASE, p =0.427 in PRIV, p =0.612 in PUB, all tests two-tails. For workers’ profits: p = 
0.038 in BASE, p =0.252 in PRIV, p =0.369 in PUB, all tests two-tails. 
29 https://www.eleconomista.es/legislacion/noticias/11242527/05/21/La-ley-obligara-a-informar-del-sueldo-antes-de-la-
entrevista.html?fbclid=IwAR1ps57ZgHdETU8Wc146ngBAKPkfoZeEL5AkdvexzPTbJAblp1HbEyHMv4c 
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treatments, workers made wage proposals that were either private or public in a subsequent 
treatment. Wage proposals were non-binding and hence cheap talk. We, however, find that 
simply making proposals has important implications for workers and firms. 
Our results indicate that pre-play communication matters and promotes higher average 
wage offers relative to the baseline without proposals. We have also shown that making 
proposals public increases firm profits. As predicted by the theoretical model, both private and 
public proposals lower rejection rates and hence increase efficiency relative to the baseline. 
This is an important result, as it shows that non-binding pre-play communication has non-
trivial welfare implications. We also explore the effects on income distribution. While workers 
earn more under proposals, wage proposals decrease income inequality. In fact, workers 
income is the most unequal in the baseline (without proposals). Finally, we also provide some 
evidence that making a proposal, whether public or private, eliminates gender bias in 
acceptance rates. 
Our experiment also reveals another element of making wage proposals public. Even 
though average wages increase under proposals, they increase by a greater amount when 
proposals are private. Thus, we find that making worker wages public mainly benefits the firm. 
This is because publicly available proposals generate a conformity effect where workers are 
less likely to reject, which decreases wages relative to the case where proposals are made 
privately.  
 The previous result is contrary to popular belief as indicated by the motivation behind 
some policy measures that have been recently gaining increased attraction. These relate to wage 
disclosure policies in organizations to address income inequality with emphasis on fair 
remuneration30 or wage disclosure for the sake of transparency (a la California, Switzerland, 
Norway or Denmark) 31. For example, the UK (since January 1, 2019) has a pay disclosure 
policy where its biggest companies have to disclose and explain every year their top bosses 
pay and the gap between that and their average worker. Similar measures have also been 
                                                 
30 https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/strategy/reward/pay-fairness-reporting-factsheet 
31  See for example, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-executive-pay-transparency-measures-come-into-force, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/11/21/the-growing-movement-to-make-employees-salaries-public-for-all-to-
see/?sh=68cb40a97bb8,https://time.com/5353848/salary-pay-transparency-work/and 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/19/magazine/salary-sharing.html. 
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adopted in several countries such as Norway, Sweden, Finland and states in US32. Further, 
recently the EU commission has presented a proposal as regards wage transparency that aims 
to guarantee the same wages for the same work and to address gender discrimination. We find 
that while the use of public proposals eliminates many gender differences, making information 
public for proposals works to the benefit of the firms. 
Our paper is a first step in trying to understand the complicated interaction between 
public and private information in labour markets and its subsequent impact on worker wages, 
firm profits and overall efficiency. While inequality in salaries in the workplace is a growing 
policy concern, it is, however, not clear its wider implications towards work performance and 
well-being will be. It remains as an open question what the effect of wage proposals in the 
labor market will be when effort levels are considered.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A1: Instructions for PRIV treatment33 
General instructions 
 
You are taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions 
carefully. Depending upon the decisions you make you can earn additional money in addition 
to the 3 Euros fee for your participation. It is extremely important that you read the instructions 
carefully. 
 
Absolutely no communication whatsoever is allowed in the course of the experiment. 
Please address questions you might have to us directly. Any violation of this will lead to 
the exclusion from both the experiment and all payments.  
 
This experiment consists of companies and employees. Each individual will be assigned 
randomly the role of a company, or employee, and will maintain the same role during the entire 
experiment.  
 
The entire experiment comprises of 15 periods. In each period, each company will be randomly 
matched with two employees. 
 
The identity of the employees will not be disclosed to any company before or after the 
experiment. Likewise, employees will not know with which firm they have been paired or the 
identity of other employees who are assigned to the same company as them. 
 
 
 
Decisions in each period 
 
At the beginning of each period, the company will receive a salary proposal from her two 
potential employees. The salary proposal is not binding, that is, companies can decide whether 
to make the proposed offer, another offer or no offer. The proposals will be private, that is, 
each employee will only know his proposal (not the one of the other employee). 
 
After learning the salary proposals, the company can submit a salary offer separately to one, 
or both, employees, or submit no offer at all. Each offer received by an employee is known 
only to them. 
 
Once an employee learns the salary offer and its amount, they will have to decide whether to 
accept or reject it. Employees will never know whether the company they are paired with 
has submitted an offer to the other employee. 
 
Employees learn only the amount of their own salary offer. They don’t know if the company 
submitted any other salary offers. If, for instance, a company submits a salary offer to one 
employee and a different one to the other employee, none of the employees will learn the other 
employee’s offer.  
                                                 
33 Instructions for other treatments are available upon request. 
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The company’s income in each period 
 
When an offer is accepted, the employee and the company close a contract. This will generate 
the following income for the company: 
 
 If the company concludes a contract with the two employees, she will achieve an income 
of 780 points - salary offered to employee 1 - salary offered to employee 2. 
 
 If the company concludes a contract with one employee, she will achieve an income of 390 
points - the salary offered to the employee who accepted the offer. 
 
 If the company concludes no contract at all (because she has not made an offer or because 
her offers has not been accepted), she will achieve an income of zero points. 
 
 
The employee’s income in each period 
 
 If no offer of salary is submitted to you, your income amounts to zero. 
 
 If you accept the salary offer, your income will be the amount of the salary offered. 
 
 If you reject the salary offer, your income will be zero. 
 
 
 
EXAMPLES of how income is calculated in a period 
 
1. The employee 1 makes a salary proposal of 70 points and employee 2 of 150 points. 
The company submits two salary offers, 120 points to employee 1 and 120 points to 
employee 2. Both reject the offer: 
 
-Income for the company: 0 
-Income for the employees: 0 
 
2. The employee 1 makes a salary proposal of 250 points and employee 2 of 100 points. 
The company submits two salary offers to the two employees, 80 points to employee 1 and 
200 to employee 2. If both accept the offer: 
 
-Income for the company: 780-80-200 = 500 
-Income for employee 1: 80 
-Income for employee 2: 200 
 
3. The employee 1 makes a salary proposal of 65 points and employee 2 of 220 points. 
The company submits a salary offer to employee 1 of 180 points. If employee 1 accepts 
the offer: 
 
-Income for the company: 390-180 = 210 
-Income for employee 1: 180 
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-Income for employee 2: 0 
 
 
Please note: 
 
 The salary you offer to be paid to the employee only if the offer is actually accepted. 
 
 The above mentioned rules apply to all companies and all employees. They are known to 
each company and to each employee. 
 
 
How to make your decision 
 
All decisions will be made on the screen. At the beginning of each period, you will be shown 
the following screen for companies: 
 
 
 
On this screen, the company will have to decide whether to submit a salary offer to each 
employee. To do so, the company must click either “Yes” or “No” in the respective input fields.  
 
If the company clicks “Yes” for a particular employee, then she will be asked to enter the 
amount of the salary offer she wants to make to that particular employee.  
 
If the company clicks “No”, that particular employee will not get a salary offer.  
 
The permitted numbers for salary offers are between 0 and 390: 
0   salary offer   390 
 
Once the company has made her decision(s) and entered the input, she must click the OK 
button. Important, the company can revise her decisions as long as the OK button is not 
activated. 
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To finish this stage, the company must click on the “NEXT” button (on the right bottom 
corner). 
 
 
 
The following screen shows the decision that the employee will have to make in the event that 
they have received a salary offer: 
 
 
 
On this screen, the employee will be informed of the exact amount of the offer. Afterwards, 
the employee must decide whether to accept or reject the offer by clicking on "accept" or 
"reject". 
If the employee has not received an offer, the message "The company has decided not to make 
any offer to you in this period" will appear. 
The income for that period will then appear on the screen. 
 
This concludes the period. In the following period, each company will be randomly 
assigned two new employees. At the end of each period, the company will be able to see the 
salary offers of each employee and the income of the previous periods. Employees will see the 
offers received (only their own) and their income from previous periods. 
   
Before starting the experiment, we will tell you on the computer screen the equivalence 
between points and Euros. 
 
You will only be paid the points corresponding to a randomly chosen round by rolling a die. 
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Appendix A2: Control Questions for PRIV and PUB treatments34 
It is mandatory to answer every question. Wrong answers have no consequences. Address any 
questions to us! 
 
1. Employee 1 makes a wage proposal of 100 points and employee 2 of 120. The company 
does not make wage offers to any of the employees. What is the income in points for, 
 
 The company: 0 
 Each of the employees: 0 
 
2. Employee 1 makes a wage proposal of 80 points and employee 2 of 120. The company 
sends wage offers to employee 1 and 2 for a value of 250 points. What is the income 
in points for, 
 
 (a) Both employees accept the offer. What is the income in points for, 
  
 The company: 280 
 Each of the employees: 250 
 
 (b) Employee 1 accepts the offer and 2 rejects it. What is the income in points for, 
   
 The company:140 
 Employee 2: 0 
 
 
3. Employee 1 makes a wage proposal of 30 points and employee 2 of 70. The company 
sends a wage offer for a value of 30 pints to employee 1 and a wage offer of 60 points to 
employee 2. What is the income in points if, 
 
(a) Both employees accept the offer. What is the income in points for, 
 
 The company: 690 
 Each of the employees: 60 
 
 (b) Employee 1 accepts the offer and 2 rejects it. What is the income in points for, 
 
                                                 
34 Control questions for Baseline are available upon request. 
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 The company:360 
 Employee 1: 30 
 (c) Both employees reject the offer. What is the income in points for, 
 
 The company: 0 
 Each of the employees: 0 
 
Appendix A3: Post-questionnaire 
In this questionnaire we ask you to give us some general information about yourself. After 
carefully reading each section, we ask you to answer by writing an "x" in the appropriate box. 
Please, answer all the questions.  
Thank you for participating! 
General information: 
1. Date of birth: 
2. Gender: a) Male: ☐         b) Female: ☐ 
3. School and Degree that you study at the university:  
School:…………… 
Degree:…………… 
4. What is the zip code of your parents' house? 
 
5 . If Juan can drink a barrel of water in 6 days and Maria can drink a barrel in 12 days, how 
long do they need to drink a barrel between the two of them? 
 
6. Juan receives the fifteenth highest grade in his class and at the same time the fifteenth lowest 
grade in his class. How many students are there in class? 
 
 
7.  A man buys a pig for € 60, sells it for € 70, buys it again for € 80, and finally sells it for € 
90. How much money has he made? 
 
8. Simon decides to invest € 8,000 in shares one day at the beginning of 2018. Six months after 
investing, on July 17, the shares he bought decrease in value by 50%. Fortunately, from July 
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17 to October 17, the shares you have purchased increase in value by 75%. At this moment, 
Simon 
 a. did not win or lose anything in the stocks market, 
 b. his shares have a higher value tan when he started, 
 c. he lost money (his shares lost value)  
 
9. Imagine that you are participating in a program in which you have to decide how many boxes 
to open out of a total of 100 numbered boxes. All boxes contain € 10 except one that has € 0. 
You do not know where the box with no money is, only that it can be in any of the 100 boxes 
with the same probability. The boxes are opened in numerical order. If, for example, you decide 
to open 20 boxes, the boxes ranging from 1 to 20 will be opened; If, for example, you decide 
to open 57, all the boxes between 1 and 57 will be collected. 
How many boxes would you decide to open in this situation? 
 
 
10.- What do you think is the appropriate salary for a worker? (Remind that it must be a number 
between 0 and 390): 
 
11.- If you have participated in the experiment as a company and you have chosen different 
salaries for your two workers in the same period, why have you done it? (If you have not been 
a company, please write "I am a worker"). 
 
12.- If you have participated in the experiment as a worker, what is the minimum wage you 
would be willing to accept? (If you have not been a worker, please write “I am a company”). 
 
13.- Do you think it is difficult for you to recognize your mistakes? 
      Yes 
      No 
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Appendix B: Theory Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1: The firm’s optimal decision is to offer the low wage if (𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
𝐿 )𝑞 ≥
𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
𝐻; otherwise, she will offer the high wage. Thus, 𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓   𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻   𝑖𝑓  𝑞 < 𝑇
. The rest 
of the Proposition follows immediately from this.  
∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2: Applying Bayes rule we can compute the firm’s belief that the worker 
is low type given the prior (𝑞) and the observation that his proposal was high: 
?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼 ≔ 𝑃(𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) =
𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚,𝐿)
𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻)
𝑞 
where 𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚,𝐿) = (1 − 𝜆) and 𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) = 1 − 𝑞𝜆 
Therefore, when observing a high proposal, the firm’s optimal decision is to offer a low wage 
if (𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
𝐿 )?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼 ≥ 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
𝐻; otherwise, she will offer a high wage. Thus, if we denote by 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼  to be the optimal wage when observing a high proposal, we get ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 =
{
𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓   ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻    𝑖𝑓 ?̂?
𝑃𝑅𝐼 < 𝑇
 
And because the firm always matches the proposal of the low type (which is fully revealing), 
the optimal firm’s policy is:  
𝑤𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿   𝑖𝑓   𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼   𝑖𝑓  𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
 
The rest of the proposition follows immediately from this. 
∎ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1: First note that ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼 < 𝑞 and hence, when comparing PRI and BASE 
there are three possible cases: 
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(i) 𝑇 ≤ ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼 
In this case, ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 which means that, regardless of proposals, wage offers 
are the same in both cases, 𝑤𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿, and this leads to the same firms profits 
Π𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = Π𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸; workers income Π𝑊
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = Π𝑊
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 and acceptance rates 𝑟𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑟𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑞. 
(ii) 𝑇 > 𝑞 
In this case, ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻. Therefore, expected firm’s profits are: 
Π𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑞𝜆(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) + (1 − 𝑞𝜆)(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) = 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)           
> Π𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 
Expected worker’s incomes are: 
Π𝑊
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑞𝜆𝑤𝑚,𝐿 + (1 − 𝑞𝜆)𝑤𝑚,𝐻 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) > Π𝑊
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 
And acceptance rates are: 𝑟𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑟𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 1 
(iii) 𝑇 ∈ (?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼 , 𝑞] 
In this case, ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 > 𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 . Therefore, firm’s profits in PRI are (see case ii): 
Π𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) while expected firm’s profits in BASE are: Π𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 =
𝑞(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)  where Π𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐼 > Π𝐹
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸  iff 𝑀(1 − 𝑞) > 𝑤𝑚,𝐻(1 − 𝑞𝜆) − 𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿(1 − 𝜆) . Note 
that for this condition not to hold 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 should be relatively close to 𝑀 (i.e., 𝑀 sufficiently low) 
in which case 𝑇 > 𝑞 and hence condition (iii) would not hold.  
Expected worker’s incomes are: Π𝑊
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) > Π𝑊
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿 
And acceptance rate are: 𝑟𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 1 > 𝑞 = 𝑟𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸  
Proof of Proposition 3: Applying Bayes rule we can compute the firm’s belief that the worker 
is low type given the prior (𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵), and the observation that his proposal was high: 
?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≔ 𝑃(𝑤𝑚
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) =
𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿)
𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻)
𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵 
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where  𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿) = (1 − 𝜆𝑞) and 𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻) = 1 − 𝜆𝑞𝑞
𝑃𝑈𝐵. 
Therefore, when observing a high proposal, the firm’s optimal decision is to offer a low wage 
if (𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
𝐿 )?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
𝐻; otherwise, she will offer a high wage. Thus, if we denote by 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵  to be the optimal wage when observing a high proposal, we get ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵 =
{
𝑤𝑚,𝐿     𝑖𝑓  ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻    𝑖𝑓 ?̂?
𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇
 
And because the firm always matches the proposal of the low type (which is fully revealing), 
the optimal firm’s policy is:  
𝑤𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐿   𝑖𝑓   𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵   𝑖𝑓  𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
 
The rest of the proposition follows immediately from this. 
∎ 
Proof of Corollary 2: First note that ?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 > ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼 because 𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞. Moreover, ?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞 
and ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼 < 𝑞. Therefore, ?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞 > ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼. From Propositions 1-3, we know that if  ?̂?𝑃𝑈𝐵 >
𝑞 > 𝑇 > ?̂?𝑃𝑅𝐼, then 𝑤𝑜
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 (Proposition 1); ?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 (Proposition 2) and 
?̃?𝑜
𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 (Proposition 3). The rest of the Corollary follows immediately from these 
optimal wage offers. 
∎ 
Proof of Corollary 3: It follows immediately from Corollary 2 and the arguments in the text. 
 
 
